The Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate on Several Questions Concerning the Application of the Criminal Trial-in-Absentia Procedure (Fa Shi [2026] No. 11) took effect on 22 May 2026 and comprise twenty-four articles1. It is an important judicial interpretation that systematically refines the application of the trial-in-absentia procedure. The procedure is of relatively limited application, and is widely regarded as a “weapon for pursuing fugitives”; yet the difficulty of the institution lies not in how to convict the accused while he is absent, but in how, in his absence, to make the proceeding still deserve the name of a “trial.”
Where a person suspected of embezzlement, who has fled and remained abroad for years, is prosecuted under the trial-in-absentia procedure and a conviction is obtained, this is often taken as a milestone in the pursuit. But the value of a judgment in absentia lies not in its being handed down, but in its holding: it must be recognised and assisted in enforcement abroad, and it must withstand the objection and the retrial of the accused on the day he surrenders. What Fa Shi [2026] No. 11 truly works at is making real the rights of the one not present — defence, the challenge of evidence, the evidentiary threshold for pre-departure confessions, and retrial upon surrender. It is precisely this set of safeguards that allows a judgment in absentia to gain a footing abroad and to be turned into actual recovery of assets and cooperative outcomes.
I. Trial in absentia under Article 291 takes the accused’s being abroad as a hard constraint; the new Provisions refine application within the statutory categories of cases, rather than expanding the pursuit
A boundary must first be drawn. This article concerns only the “fugitive” type of trial in absentia, in which the accused is abroad, that is, the situation under Article 291 of the Criminal Procedure Law. The trial-in-absentia procedure also covers cases tried in the accused’s absence because of his serious illness or death (Articles 296 and 297), which do not take being abroad as a requirement and are outside the scope of this article2.
The scope of the fugitive type of trial in absentia is fixed by Article 291 of the Criminal Procedure Law: cases of embezzlement and bribery, and cases of crimes seriously endangering national security or of terrorist activities that require timely trial and have been approved by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, with the common requirement that the suspect or defendant be abroad3. Its application is from the outset subject to multiple constraints: the categories of cases are fixed by statute; cases of serious endangerment of national security and of terrorist activities require the approval of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate; the accused must be abroad; and the matter must have been transferred for prosecution by the supervisory or public-security authority, with the People’s Procuratorate of the view that the facts of the crime have been clarified, the evidence is reliable and sufficient, and criminal responsibility is to be pursued according to law.
Fa Shi [2026] No. 11 does not loosen this framework. Its Article 1 merely defines the extension of “cases of embezzlement and bribery,” making clear that it includes the crimes of embezzlement and bribery provided in Chapter Eight of the Specific Provisions of the Criminal Law, as well as crimes provided in other chapters that are convicted and punished according to Chapter Eight4; Article 3 further provides that where a suspect or defendant is charged with several crimes, part of which meet the conditions for trial in absentia, the procedure may be applied to that part of the case, and where, in a case of joint crime, some defendants meet the conditions, the procedure may be applied to them respectively5. Its Article 24 then declares that, where judicial interpretations and normative documents issued before the Provisions take effect are inconsistent with the Provisions, the Provisions shall prevail6. All of this is a clarification of the criteria of application and a refinement of procedure, not an expansion of the categories of cases. To imagine trial in absentia as an all-purpose weapon of pursuit applicable uniformly to any fugitive is to misread its statutory boundaries.
II. The more absent the accused, the less the defence may be absent: mandatory legal aid raises the right to defence from a waivable right to a structural requirement of the trial’s legitimacy
In an ordinary trial held in the defendant’s presence, the defender is an extension of the defendant’s will, and the defendant may even choose to retain no defender and defend himself. Trial in absentia is different. Article 293 of the Criminal Procedure Law provides that in a case tried in absentia the defendant has the right to retain a defender, and his close relatives may retain one on his behalf; where neither the defendant nor his close relatives has retained a defender, the People’s Court shall notify a legal-aid institution to assign a lawyer to defend him7. Fa Shi [2026] No. 11, in Article 9, further makes clear that the defendant has the right to retain, or to have his close relatives retain on his behalf, one or two defenders; where none has been retained, the People’s Court shall notify a legal-aid institution to assign a lawyer to defend him8.
Where neither the defendant nor his close relatives has retained a defender, the People’s Court is under a statutory duty to notify a legal-aid institution to assign a lawyer, and may not leave the defence empty merely because the defendant is absent. The reason in principle is this: the defendant being already absent, the defender is the only adversarial presence of that absent person in the courtroom. Were the defence also to be absent, the prosecution’s case would go unchallenged, and what is called a trial would decline into a one-sided conviction in absentia. Mandatory assignment of defence thus fixes the defence, from an arrangement that might lapse because the defendant is away, into a structural requirement of the trial’s legitimacy; its significance lies no longer only in serving a particular defendant, but in upholding the legitimacy of the trial-in-absentia procedure itself.
III. Absence is not the abandonment of challenge; the evidentiary threshold for pre-departure confessions is the most exacting gate of the law of evidence in a trial in absentia
That the accused is absent does not mean that evidence may be admitted without being challenged. Article 13 of Fa Shi [2026] No. 11 prescribes the order of the court investigation in a trial in absentia: the public prosecutor first adduces evidence and the defender states his views in challenge, and then the defender adduces evidence and the public prosecutor states his views in challenge9. The challenge of evidence is not abolished because the defendant is absent; it is instead conducted by the defender on his behalf.
What is truly exacting is the evidentiary standing of the defendant’s pre-trial statements. Our Criminal Procedure Law has no express provision for a “principle of directness and orality” or a “right of confrontation,” both of which are doctrinal concepts; but that evidence may serve as a basis for deciding a case only after being verified as true, and that witness testimony may serve as such a basis only after being challenged and verified in court, are general rules fixed by statute10. The accused being abroad and not in court, the statements he made before leaving the territory can no longer be checked, explained, rebutted or questioned by him in person at the hearing. Article 14, paragraph 2, of Fa Shi [2026] No. 11 sets a threshold for this: confessions and defences made by the accused before leaving the territory may serve as a basis for deciding the case only where they have been verified as true through the adducing and challenge of evidence and other court-investigation procedures at the hearing11.
The substance of this provision is that, where the defendant is absent, the responsibility of testing his pre-trial statements falls upon the defender’s challenge on his behalf and the court’s substantive examination. It is at once the evidentiary channel by which a trial in absentia can find the facts, and the point at which the procedure is most open to criticism in the law of evidence: how much probative force the absent person’s pre-departure confession carries, and whether it can support the finding of key facts, turns on whether the court’s grasp of “verified as true” is a substantive examination or a mere formality. Whether the scrutiny at this gate is solid often decides whether the factual foundation of a judgment in absentia can withstand re-examination in the future.
IV. The “unfinished” quality of a judgment in absentia: retrial upon surrender and the right of appeal keep it a judgment that may still be reopened after the accused surrenders — which is also an important source of its legitimacy for recognition abroad
A judgment in absentia is not final and unshakeable. Article 294 of the Criminal Procedure Law preserves the right of appeal of the defendant and his close relatives, the avenue for the defender to appeal with the consent of the defendant or his close relatives, and the procuratorate’s right of protest where it considers the judgment to be in error12; Article 295 further distinguishes two situations of surrender: where, in the course of the trial, the defendant voluntarily surrenders or is apprehended, the People’s Court shall retry the case; where the offender surrenders after the judgment or ruling has taken legal effect, the People’s Court shall, before delivering him for execution of the sentence, inform him that he has the right to object to the judgment or ruling, and where the offender objects, the People’s Court shall retry the case13.
Hence a judgment in absentia has a structural unfinished quality: where the accused surrenders during the trial, the case shall be retried; where he surrenders after the judgment has taken effect, and, having been informed, raises an objection, the case shall be retried. It thus keeps open, for the accused, a channel that may be reopened after he surrenders. This feature seems to weaken the certainty of the judgment, yet it is precisely one of the important sources of the legitimacy of trial in absentia. A comparative reference may be drawn from the European Court of Human Rights in Sejdovic v. Italy, which held that, where it cannot be shown that the accused had voluntarily and unequivocally waived his right to appear, a person tried in absentia who is afterwards unable to obtain from a court a fresh determination of the merits of the charge against him, in both fact and law, suffers a violation of the right to a fair trial contrary to Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights; trial in absentia does not in itself offend the right to a fair trial, provided that the accused is guaranteed effective defence and the opportunity of a retrial upon surrender14. The retrial provided in Article 295 of our Criminal Procedure Law echoes this prevailing position.
The significance for recognition and assistance abroad also rests here. When, on the strength of a judgment in absentia, China requests a foreign state to provide criminal judicial assistance — for instance, sealing, seizure or freezing, the confiscation or return of unlawful gains, or the transfer of a sentenced person — what the requested state examines often includes whether the accused’s right to defence and right to a retrial have been safeguarded15. An irreversible conviction in absentia is exceedingly hard to obtain cooperation for abroad; whereas a judgment that has preserved room for the accused to be retried upon surrender presents a stronger appearance of legitimacy, helping to lower the obstacles to recognition or assistance in enforcement abroad. Of course, whether recognition and assistance can be obtained abroad still depends, in the end, on the domestic law of the requested state, the relevant treaties and the procedural safeguards in the individual case; extradition and repatriation follow their own treaties and cooperation arrangements and are not among the assistance matters just mentioned. The so-called unfinished quality is here not a defect but one of the very conditions of the judgment’s footing abroad.
V. Where professional judgment lies: not “whether one may convict in absentia,” but “whether this judgment can stand abroad and whether the client can shake it upon surrender”
Once this is grasped, the true professional contest in a trial in absentia lies not in whether the accused can be convicted while away, but in whether this judgment can stand abroad and whether it can be shaken when the client surrenders. The focus of the contest moves forward, from whether there is a conviction on the substance, to whether the procedure can withstand re-examination in the future.
For the prosecuting side, the important practical value of a judgment in absentia lies in whether it can support subsequent judicial assistance abroad, the recovery of assets, and arrangements for dealing with persons. For a judgment to be turned, through international criminal judicial assistance, into an actual outcome, the corresponding support is needed: the International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law lists sealing, seizure and freezing, the confiscation and return of unlawful gains, and the transfer of sentenced persons among the matters of assistance16; and the Criminal Procedure Law, from Article 298 onward, sets up a separate procedure for the confiscation of unlawful gains, applicable where the suspect or defendant has fled and cannot be brought to justice within one year of being placed on a wanted list, or has died17. Whether such support can be realised returns, again, to the premise of whether the procedural safeguards above are in place. For the defence side, the point of effort moves forward accordingly: beyond contesting the substance, the defence should especially examine whether the application of trial in absentia conforms to the statutory categories of cases, whether the evidentiary threshold for pre-departure confessions has truly been met as “verified as true,” and whether the defence under mandatory legal aid is substantively effective, and should preserve room for the client’s future retrial upon surrender.
The new Provisions, in twenty-four articles, make real, one by one, the rights of the one not present. Whether a judgment in absentia can hold turns, in the end, on whether these safeguards are truly realised in the individual case: whether the defence is substantively effective, whether the pre-departure confession can withstand substantive challenge, and whether room is left for retrial upon surrender. These are where the real weight of this proceeding lies.
This article is general information on practice only; the laws and judicial interpretations referred to are subject to their currently effective texts, and it does not constitute legal advice on any specific matter. The application of trial in absentia, the admission of evidence, and recognition and assistance abroad in any particular case must be verified case by case against the category of the case, the jurisdiction involved, and the relevant treaty and judicial-assistance arrangements.
Author & Team

Li RuiPartner, DeHeng Shenzhen · DeHeng Shenzhen Hengxin Legal Team (author)Handles the criminal trial-in-absentia procedure and the fugitive-type trial in absentia, mandatory legal aid and the safeguarding of defence rights in trials in absentia, the evidentiary threshold for pre-departure confessions and the defender’s challenge of evidence on the defendant’s behalf, retrial upon surrender and the legitimacy of judgments in absentia, the recognition of judgments in absentia abroad and international criminal judicial assistance, the procedure for confiscation of unlawful gains and cross-border recovery of fugitives and assets, as well as cross-border criminal defence and cross-border enforcement.

Xiao HuangheGlobal Partner, DeHengPRC–Hong Kong cross-jurisdiction transactions, cross-border dispute resolution and enforcement, outbound data compliance

Lin BoPartner, DeHeng ShenzhenCommercial transaction structuring and corporate disputes

Deng ZhaowenPractising Solicitor (HK) · GBA Lawyer, DeHeng ShenzhenCommon law, Hong Kong-related enforcement and disputes

Su YingtongPractising Lawyer, DeHeng ShenzhenCriminal defence, investment and financing disputes
FAQ
- Q: Is trial in absentia a “weapon for pursuing fugitives” — so that anyone abroad can be convicted in absentia?
- Li Rui: No. The fugitive type of trial in absentia is confined to the statutory situations under Article 291 of the Criminal Procedure Law: cases of embezzlement and bribery, and cases of crimes seriously endangering national security or of terrorist activities that require timely trial and have been approved by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate, with the common requirement that the suspect or defendant be abroad. Fa Shi [2026] No. 11 only refines the criteria of application within this statutory scope: Article 1 defines the extension of “cases of embezzlement and bribery,” Article 3 makes clear that the procedure may be applied separately to part of the crimes in a multi-crime case or to some defendants in a joint crime, and Article 24 governs entry into force and conflicts; it does not expand the categories of cases. To imagine it as an all-purpose tool applicable uniformly to any fugitive is to misread its statutory boundaries.
- Q: With the accused absent, can the confessions he made before leaving the territory be used directly as a basis for conviction?
- Li Rui: Not directly. The accused’s absence does not mean evidence may be admitted without challenge. Under Article 13 of Fa Shi [2026] No. 11, the court investigation in a trial in absentia still proceeds by adducing and challenging evidence, with the challenge conducted by the defender on the defendant’s behalf; Article 14, paragraph 2, further provides that confessions and defences made before leaving the territory may serve as a basis for deciding the case only after being verified as true through the adducing and challenge of evidence at the hearing. This is the most exacting gate: the absent person’s pre-trial statements cannot be checked, explained or rebutted by him in person, and their probative force turns on whether the court’s grasp of “verified as true” is a substantive examination or a mere formality.
- Q: After a judgment in absentia is handed down, can it still be overturned when the accused surrenders? And can such a judgment be enforced abroad?
- Li Rui: A judgment in absentia has a structural “unfinished” quality. Article 295 of the Criminal Procedure Law distinguishes two situations of surrender: where the defendant surrenders or is apprehended during the trial, the case shall be retried; where he surrenders after the judgment or ruling has taken effect, he shall, before being delivered for execution, be informed of his right to object, and where he objects, the case shall be retried. It is precisely this retrial upon surrender, together with effective defence under mandatory legal aid, that gives a judgment in absentia a stronger appearance of legitimacy when recognition and criminal judicial assistance are sought abroad (service, sealing/seizure/freezing, confiscation and return of unlawful gains, transfer of sentenced persons — see the International Criminal Judicial Assistance Law). But whether recognition and assistance can be obtained depends, in the end, on the domestic law of the requested state, the relevant treaties and the procedural safeguards in the individual case; extradition and repatriation follow their own treaties and cooperation arrangements.
Knowledge anchors
- Criminal trial-in-absentia procedure · Fa Shi [2026] No. 11
- Fugitive-type trial in absentia · CPL Article 291
- Mandatory legal aid · right to defence in absentia
- Pre-departure confessions · evidentiary threshold · challenge by defender
- Retrial upon surrender · CPL Article 295
- Recognition and assistance in enforcement of judgments in absentia abroad
- International criminal judicial assistance · confiscation of unlawful gains · fugitive and asset recovery