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投融资争议 · 对赌回购

对赌回购能否兑现，系于效力、期间与主体三事

业绩对赌之回购条款，常被投资方视为退出之最后保障。然自约定至兑现，其间横亘三道关口：一为效力，对赌回购是否为法律所认可；二为期间，回购权是否仍处可行使之时限；三为主体，回购义务究由公司抑或个人承担。三者层层递进，缺一则保障落空；条款写得再周详，亦不能替代对此三事之事前判断。

投融资争议作者 · 肖黄鹤 律师约 7 分钟阅读中 / EN 双语

一、对赌回购之效力，已从“一概无效”走到“有效而未必可履行”

对赌回购能否主张，首在效力，而此一立场十余年间几经转折。早期实践以“海富案”为标志，确立“与股东对赌有效、与目标公司对赌无效”之二分，其虑在于与公司对赌将损及公司及债权人利益，有违资本维持。1

至《全国法院民商事审判工作会议纪要》，立场转向。其第五条明定，投资方与目标公司订立之对赌协议，若无其他法定无效事由，目标公司仅以存在股权回购或者金钱补偿约定为由主张协议无效者，人民法院不予支持。2 自此，与公司对赌由“原则无效”转为“原则有效”。须留意者，此处所排除者，仅“约定有回购或补偿”这一项无效抗辩；其余法定无效事由，如违反法律、行政法规之强制性规定，损害债权人利益，违背公序良俗，仍可致其无效，不可一概而论。

然纪要在确认效力之同时，埋下一处关键区分，即“有效”不等于“可实际履行”。此一区分，正是后文期间与主体两道关口之由来，亦是其后“华工案”等裁判与纪要立场产生张力之所在。3 对投资方而言，对赌回购自此不再是效力之争，而转为“虽属有效、却未必拿得到”之执行之争。

二、回购权亦有行使期间，逾期怠于行使者，权利可能不复存在

效力既定，次一关口为期间。此处最易被投资方忽略，亦最具实务杀伤力，盖回购权之“性质”迄今未有定论，而性质不同、期间随之而异，同一纠纷于不同法院或得相反之结论。

一种意见认回购权属形成权，投资方一方意思即可使法律关系发生变动，故应受除斥期间约束，并类推适用解除权一年之行使期间，期间届满则权利消灭，不因主张而中断、延长。4 此种立场多见于上海法院之裁判，且有裁判进一步认为，回购权之行使期间应短于解除权。另一种意见认其系债权请求权，适用三年诉讼时效，时效可因主张而中断、因起诉而重新计算，此种立场多见于北京法院。两种定性之下，投资方迟延行权之后果截然不同，于一地或被认定权利已罹于除斥期间而归于消灭，于另一地或仍在时效保护之内。

最高人民法院于《法答网精选答问（第九批）》中，就此倾向于形成权之定性，并认为为维护公司经营之商业预期，未约定行权期间者，其合理期间以不超过六个月为宜。5 此一意见有二点须审慎对待。其一，就效力层级而言，法答网答问系最高人民法院之倾向性意见，非司法解释，不具强制约束力，裁判中不得作为依据径行援引；其出台之后，仍有高级人民法院按债权请求权、适用诉讼时效裁判，分歧并未因之消弭。其二，就时点结构而言，所谓“六个月”系投资方提出回购请求即行使回购权之期间，而非起诉之期间，更非诉讼时效本身；投资方于该期间内提出请求后，三年诉讼时效自请求之次日另行起算。二者为前后相承之两段，不可混同。

明乎此，投资方不宜将回购权视为长悬不坠、随时可用之保障。稳妥之道有二：一在约定阶段即明确回购权之行使期间，以免受“合理期间”不确定性所累；二在对赌条件一经触发，即以书面方式及时行权并留存送达凭证，使行权之事实与时点皆有据可查，而非以“业已约定回购”自安、坐待时机流逝。

三、回购义务由谁承担，决定此一退出之路走不走得通

期间之外，更为根本者为主体。回购义务人究系目标公司，抑或创始人、实际控制人个人，其请求权基础与可执行性迥然不同，往往直接决定投资方能否真正退出。

向目标公司主张回购者，受公司法资本维持原则之刚性约束。与公司对赌虽属有效，然有效不等于可履行。请求目标公司回购股权者，须以完成减资程序为前置，公司未完成减资的，人民法院应驳回其请求；请求目标公司承担金钱补偿者，则以公司有可分配利润为限，公司无利润、或虽有利润而不足以补偿的，驳回或部分支持。6 减资程序本身亦非易事，公司减少注册资本，应当编制资产负债表及财产清单，于法定期限内通知并公告债权人，债权人有权要求清偿或提供相应担保，减资决议尚须经股东会特别决议通过。7

由是生出一重难解之悖论。未完成减资，则公司不得回购；一旦完成减资，则相应股权已随减资而注销，亦无可回购。公司回购于程序上首尾相衔，殊难落地。况新公司法以同比例减资为原则，定向减资于有限责任公司须全体股东另有约定，实务中近乎需全体股东一致同意。投资方多为持股比例有限之小股东，既无力推动公司主动启动减资，又难以促成全体股东就定向减资达成一致，遂常见“判决支持、执行落空”之局，胜诉判决终成一纸空文。

向创始人、实际控制人个人主张回购者，情形迥异。此乃纯粹之合同给付义务，不触发减资、利润分配等公司法强制性规定之审查，无须先行减资即可请求实际履行，请求权基础直接，执行路径较为顺畅。惟个人之履行能力具有变动性，财产相对封闭、难以查控，并受个人债务清理、执行不能之影响，履约风险由“制度障碍”转为“履行能力”，另在他处。是故实务中常将义务主体作复合安排，或约定公司与股东共负回购义务，或约定公司优先、公司因法律障碍或资金不足不能回购时由股东承担，以两途相济、互为补充。就增信而言，第三人为目标公司之回购义务提供担保者，其担保责任不因公司未完成减资而免除，可借第三人担保实质保障投资方受偿；惟不得以公司自身提供担保或承担违约责任之方式，变相规避减资、间接强制公司回购。8

四、立法与司法之新动向，使公司回购之路更趋审慎

回购履行之约束，近年仍在收紧，撰约与争议应对皆须关注。新公司法确立同比例减资为原则，已如前述，使“先减资、后回购”之路径较旧法更难通行。司法层面，最高人民法院于《关于适用〈公司法〉若干问题的解释（征求意见稿）》中进一步明确，对赌协议虽属有效，公司未依法完成减资程序或依法分配利润者，请求其继续履行不予支持；当事人以违约责任，或以公司自身财产提供担保之方式，变相要求公司担责者，亦不予支持，惟第三人提供担保不在此限。9 须特别说明者，该解释截至本文撰写之日（2026年6月）尚为征求意见稿、未正式施行，上述内容系司法走向之展示，而非现行有效之规则；撰约与诉讼仍应以现行法及生效裁判为据，并留意其后续是否正式出台及终稿表述。

五、回购条款之价值，定于签约之时，而非违约之后

综观效力、期间、主体三事，对赌回购条款之实际价值，系于权利是否经得起期间之考验、义务人是否真正可供执行，而非仅系于是否约定了回购。

就签约而言，宜在四处着力。其一，明确回购义务之主体，于公司之外另设创始人、实际控制人之个人回购义务，或引入第三人担保，以避公司回购之程序障碍。其二，明确回购权之行使期间与起算点，免受“合理期间”不确定性之累。其三，就触发条件、通知方式与送达地址作出可操作之约定，使行权一经触发即可留痕举证。其四，对公司之减资配合义务及违约后果预为约定，纵不能强制公司回购，亦使个人或担保之兜底得以激活。凡此皆须于业绩对赌落空、纠纷既起之前完成；待执行之时方才察觉，则所执者或为一纸已过期、或为一纸难以落地之保障，已属为时过晚。具体安排仍须结合交易结构、主体类型与所涉法域之裁判口径，审慎评判，不可一概套用。

对赌回购条款之价值，定于签约之时，而非违约之后：权利是否经得起期间之考验、义务人是否真正可供执行，远比“是否写了回购”更为要紧。
本文为一般性实务说明，所涉法律、司法解释及裁判口径以现行有效文本为准，不构成针对个案的法律意见；具体对赌安排之效力、行权期间与义务主体，须结合交易结构、合同约定与所涉法域裁判口径逐案核查。其中《公司法司法解释（征求意见稿）》截至本文撰写之日尚未正式施行，以正式出台文本为准。

作者与团队 · Author & Team

  • 肖黄鹤 Xiao Huanghe
    肖黄鹤Xiao Huanghe德恒全球合伙人 · 德恒深圳恒信律师团队在投融资与公司争议领域，办理对赌协议（估值调整协议）的效力与履行、股权回购与金钱补偿、回购权行使期间与诉讼时效、回购义务主体与第三人担保、公司减资与资本维持原则、“判决支持、执行落空”之应对等事项；并主办内地与香港跨法域交易、跨境争议解决与判决执行。
  • 李睿 Li Rui
    李睿Li Rui德恒深圳合伙人融资租赁与商事金融争议、投融资争议解决、跨境执行、刑事辩护
  • 林博 Lin Bo
    林博Lin Bo德恒深圳合伙人商事交易安排、公司相关争议解决
  • 邓兆文 Deng Zhaowen
    邓兆文Deng Zhaowen香港执业律师 · 德恒深圳大湾区执业律师普通法、涉港执行与争议解决
  • 苏影彤 Su Yingtong
    苏影彤Su Yingtong德恒深圳执业律师刑事辩护、投融资争议解决

脚注 · Notes

  1. “海富案”（最高人民法院（2012）民提字第11号，苏州工业园区海富投资有限公司诉甘肃世恒有色资源再利用有限公司、香港迪亚有限公司等增资纠纷再审案）系投资方与目标公司对赌效力之标志性裁判，确立“与股东对赌有效、与目标公司对赌无效”之早期立场。本文于学理沿革层面引述，裁判要旨以裁判文书原件为准。↩
  2. 《全国法院民商事审判工作会议纪要》（法〔2019〕254号，最高人民法院2019年11月8日印发）第五条。该纪要系审判工作会议纪要，为统一裁判思路之指导，非司法解释，裁判中不得作为依据径行援引，仅供说理。↩
  3. “华工案”（江苏省高级人民法院（2019）苏民再62号，江苏华工创业投资有限公司与扬州锻压机床股份有限公司等请求公司收购股份纠纷再审案）在目标公司具备履行能力之情形下（持续正常经营、综合评估其支付回购款不致损及资本维持与债权人利益），支持目标公司作为回购主体直接履行回购义务；其径以履行能力为据、未以完成减资为前置，与前述纪要就“与公司对赌之履行须以减资程序或可分配利润为前置”之立场存在张力，反映此一领域裁判仍有分歧。裁判要旨系据公开裁判及权威解读概括，具体以裁判文书原件为准。↩
  4. 形成权类推除斥期间之底层依据，为《中华人民共和国民法典》第五百六十四条（解除权一年行使期间）。回购权性质之争，沪、京两地裁判倾向不同（沪倾向形成权、合理期间类推解除权一年；京倾向债权请求权、适用三年诉讼时效），本文所述系实务分歧之概括，非定论；相关裁判案号可另行提供，引用前须回核裁判文书原件。↩
  5. 最高人民法院《法答网精选答问（第九批）》第二问，2024年8月29日《人民法院报》刊载。该答问系倾向性意见，非司法解释，不具强制约束力。↩
  6. 《全国法院民商事审判工作会议纪要》（法〔2019〕254号）第五条。↩
  7. 《中华人民共和国公司法》（2023年修订，2024年7月1日施行）第一百六十二条（股份回购）、第二百二十四条（减资程序及同比例减资原则）、第二百一十条（利润分配）、第五十三条（不得抽逃出资）。九民纪要原文援引者为修订前公司法第一百四十二条、第一百六十六条、第三十五条，现已重新编号。↩
  8. 复合主体与第三人担保之安排，系基于上述效力与履行规则之交易设计；其中第三人担保不受公司未减资影响之方向，另见脚注〔9〕。↩
  9. 最高人民法院《关于适用〈公司法〉若干问题的解释（征求意见稿）》（2025年9月30日公开征求意见）第三十七条（估值调整协议之效力及履行；股权回购性质另见第三十八条）。该稿截至本文撰写之日（2026年6月）尚未正式施行，所述系司法走向，非现行有效规则，引用从其草案，并以正式出台之文本为准。↩

常见问题 · FAQ

Q：与目标公司签的对赌回购条款有效吗？
A：据九民纪要第五条，与目标公司的对赌（含股权回购或金钱补偿约定）若无其他法定无效事由，法院不以“约定了回购或补偿”为由认定无效，即原则有效；但有效不等于可实际履行，向公司主张回购仍受资本维持原则约束。
Q：对赌回购权有没有行使期限？过期还能主张吗？
A：有，且后果取决于性质——京沪裁判分歧：形成权适用除斥期间（类推解除权一年），债权请求权适用三年诉讼时效；最高法《法答网精选答问（第九批）》倾向形成权、合理期间以不超过六个月为宜（倾向性意见、非司法解释）。怠于行权可能致权利消灭。
Q：为什么向公司主张回购常判决支持却执行不了？
A：公司回购以完成减资为前置——未减资不得回购、已减资股权又注销而无可回购，成“减资死循环”；加之新公司法以同比例减资为原则、定向减资近乎需全体股东一致，小股东难推动，遂“判决支持、执行落空”。
Q：回购义务人写公司好还是写创始人个人好？
A：向公司主张受减资、利润分配约束、障碍大；向创始人个人系纯合同给付义务、无须减资即可请求实际履行、路径更顺，但受个人履约能力影响。实务多作复合安排，并可引入第三人担保（其责任不因公司未减资而免除）。
Q：对赌回购条款怎么签才真正保障退出？
A：四处着力——公司外另设个人回购或第三人担保／明确行使期间与起算点／约定触发条件通知送达便于留痕／预设减资配合义务与违约后果；核心是签约时即把效力、期间、主体三事判准。

知识锚点 · Knowledge anchors

  • 对赌协议 / 估值调整协议 VAM
  • 股权回购 · 金钱补偿
  • 回购权行使期间 · 形成权 / 债权请求权
  • 合理期间“不超过六个月” · 法答网第九批
  • 九民纪要第五条 · 原则有效
  • 减资前置 · 减资死循环 · 资本维持
  • 回购义务主体 · 公司 / 创始人 / 第三人担保
  • 公司法司法解释（征求意见稿）
←  Back to insights

Investment disputes · VAM buy-back

Whether a VAM Buy-Back Can Be Realised Turns on Three Things: Validity, Time and Obligor

The buy-back clause in a performance-based valuation-adjustment mechanism (VAM) is often treated by investors as the last line of exit. Yet between agreement and realisation lie three gates: validity — whether the buy-back is recognised by law; time — whether the buy-back right is still within the period in which it may be exercised; and obligor — whether the buy-back duty falls on the company or on an individual. The three build one upon another, and the failure of any one defeats the protection; however fully the clause is drafted, it cannot replace a judgment on these three made in advance.

Investment disputesBy Xiao Huanghe7 min read中 / EN bilingual

I. The validity of a VAM buy-back has moved from “void across the board” to “valid, yet not necessarily enforceable”

Whether a VAM buy-back may be claimed turns first on validity, a position that has shifted several times over more than a decade. Early practice, marked by the “Haifu case,” drew a line between a buy-back agreed with shareholders, held valid, and one agreed with the target company, held void — the concern being that a VAM with the company would harm the company and its creditors, contrary to capital maintenance.1

With the Minutes of the National Court Work Conference on Civil and Commercial Adjudication, the position turned. Article 5 provides that, where an investor and a target company enter into a VAM, and the target, absent any other statutory ground of invalidity, asserts the agreement void solely on the ground that it contains a share buy-back or cash-compensation clause, the court shall not support that assertion.2 A VAM with the company thereby moved from “void in principle” to “valid in principle.” It must be noted that what is excluded is only this one ground of invalidity — “a buy-back or compensation was agreed”; other statutory grounds, such as violation of mandatory provisions of laws and administrative regulations, harm to creditors, or breach of public order and good morals, may still render it void, and no sweeping conclusion can be drawn.

Yet the Minutes, in confirming validity, planted a crucial distinction: “valid” is not the same as “capable of actual performance.” This distinction is the very source of the two later gates of time and obligor, and the point at which subsequent decisions such as the “Huagong case” sit in tension with the position of the Minutes.3 For the investor, the VAM buy-back is from this point no longer a contest over validity, but a contest over enforcement — “valid, yet perhaps not collectable.”

II. The buy-back right too has a period of exercise; one who delays may find the right no longer exists

Validity settled, the next gate is time. It is the most easily overlooked by investors and the most damaging in practice, for the “nature” of the buy-back right remains unsettled to this day; and as the nature differs, so does the period, so that the same dispute may meet opposite conclusions in different courts.

One view holds the buy-back right to be a formative right: the investor’s unilateral intent suffices to alter the legal relationship, so it should be subject to a preclusive period, applying by analogy the one-year period for exercising a right of rescission; once the period expires the right is extinguished, and is neither interrupted nor extended by assertion.4 This stance appears chiefly in the decisions of the Shanghai courts, some of which hold further that the period for exercising a buy-back right should be shorter than that for rescission. The other view holds it to be a claim in obligation, subject to the three-year limitation of action, which may be interrupted by assertion and recommenced upon suit; this stance appears chiefly in the Beijing courts. Under the two characterisations the consequence of delay differs sharply: in one place the right may be held extinguished by lapse of the preclusive period, in the other it may remain within the protection of the limitation period.

In the Selected Q&A on the Judicial Answer Network (Ninth Batch), the Supreme People’s Court inclined toward the characterisation as a formative right, and held that, to preserve the commercial expectation of the company’s operation, where no period of exercise was agreed, a reasonable period of no more than six months is appropriate.5 Two points call for caution. First, as to authority, the Answer Network Q&A is a tendency-indicating opinion of the Supreme People’s Court, not a judicial interpretation; it carries no binding force and may not be cited as a basis for decision; after its issuance, high courts have still adjudicated on a claim-in-obligation, limitation-of-action footing, and the divergence has not thereby dissolved. Second, as to the structure of time, the “six months” is the period within which the investor puts forward the buy-back request — that is, exercises the buy-back right — not the period for bringing suit, still less the limitation period itself; once the investor makes the request within that period, the three-year limitation runs afresh from the day after the request. The two are successive stages and must not be conflated.

This understood, the investor should not treat the buy-back right as a protection hanging in perpetuity, available at any time. The prudent course is twofold: to fix, at the agreement stage, the period for exercising the buy-back right, so as not to be burdened by the uncertainty of a “reasonable period”; and, once the VAM condition is triggered, to exercise the right promptly in writing and preserve proof of service, so that both the fact and the time of exercise are on record — rather than resting easy on “a buy-back has been agreed” and letting the moment slip.

III. Who bears the buy-back duty decides whether this exit route is passable at all

Beyond time, the more fundamental matter is the obligor. Whether the party bound to buy back is the target company, or a founder or actual controller in person, makes the basis of claim and the enforceability markedly different, and often decides directly whether the investor can truly exit.

A claim for buy-back against the target company is subject to the rigid constraint of the capital-maintenance principle of company law. A VAM with the company, though valid, is not for that reason performable. One who asks the target to buy back its shares must first complete the capital-reduction procedure; where the company has not done so, the court shall dismiss the claim. One who asks the target to make cash compensation is limited to the company’s distributable profit; where the company has no profit, or has profit insufficient to compensate, the claim is dismissed or supported in part.6 The capital-reduction procedure is itself no easy matter: to reduce its registered capital the company must prepare a balance sheet and an inventory of property, notify and announce its creditors within the statutory period — creditors being entitled to demand satisfaction or corresponding security — and the reduction resolution must further pass by special resolution of the shareholders’ meeting.7

From this arises an intractable paradox. Without completing the reduction, the company may not buy back; once the reduction is completed, the corresponding shares are cancelled along with it, and there is nothing left to buy back. Corporate buy-back is procedurally tail-to-mouth and hard to land. Moreover, the new Company Law takes pro-rata reduction as the principle, and targeted reduction in a limited-liability company requires the separate agreement of all shareholders — in practice, near-unanimity. Investors are mostly minority shareholders of limited holding, unable to compel the company to initiate a reduction and unable to bring all shareholders to agree on a targeted one; hence the common spectacle of “supported in judgment, defeated in enforcement,” the winning judgment ending as a sheet of waste paper.

A claim for buy-back against a founder or actual controller in person is wholly different. This is a pure contractual obligation to perform; it does not trigger the scrutiny of capital reduction, profit distribution or other mandatory company-law provisions, and actual performance may be sought without any prior reduction — the basis of claim is direct and the path of enforcement comparatively smooth. Yet an individual’s capacity to perform is variable, the assets relatively closed and hard to trace and control, and subject to personal debt clearance and to enforcement coming up empty; the risk shifts from “institutional obstacle” to “capacity to perform,” and lies elsewhere. Hence practice often arranges the obligor compositely — agreeing that company and shareholder bear the buy-back duty together, or that the company is primary and, where it cannot buy back by reason of legal obstacle or want of funds, the shareholder bears it — the two routes complementing each other. As to credit enhancement, where a third party provides security for the company’s buy-back duty, that security liability is not discharged by the company’s failure to complete a reduction, and the investor’s recovery may be substantively secured through it; but the company may not, by providing security itself or by bearing liability for breach, circumvent the reduction and indirectly compel its own buy-back.8

IV. New legislative and judicial developments make the corporate buy-back route ever more cautious

The constraints on buy-back performance have continued to tighten in recent years, and both drafting and dispute response must attend to them. The new Company Law establishes pro-rata reduction as the principle, as noted above, making the “reduce first, buy back after” route harder than under the old law. On the judicial side, in the Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the Company Law (Draft for Comment), it is further made clear that, although a VAM is valid, where the company has not completed a capital reduction or distributed profit in accordance with law, a claim for its continued performance shall not be supported; and where a party, by way of liability for breach or by the company providing security with its own property, in effect requires the company to bear liability, that too shall not be supported — save that security provided by a third party is not within this limit.9 It must be specially noted that, as of the date of writing (June 2026), this interpretation remains a draft for comment and has not formally taken effect; the foregoing is a display of the judicial direction, not a currently effective rule. Drafting and litigation should still proceed on the basis of the law in force and effective decisions, with attention to whether it is later formally promulgated and to the wording of the final text.

V. The value of a buy-back clause is fixed at signing, not after breach

Surveying validity, time and obligor together, the real value of a VAM buy-back clause lies in whether the right can withstand the test of time and whether the obligor is genuinely available for enforcement — not merely in whether a buy-back was agreed.

As to drafting, effort is well spent in four places. First, fix the obligor: beyond the company, set a personal buy-back duty on the founder or actual controller, or bring in a third-party guarantee, so as to avoid the procedural obstacles of corporate buy-back. Second, fix the period for exercising the buy-back right and its starting point, so as not to be burdened by the uncertainty of a “reasonable period.” Third, make the trigger condition, the manner of notice and the address for service operable, so that once triggered the exercise leaves a documented trail. Fourth, provide in advance for the company’s duty to cooperate in a reduction and for the consequences of breach, so that, even where the company cannot be compelled to buy back, the individual or guarantee backstop is activated. All of this must be done before the VAM target is missed and the dispute has arisen; to perceive it only at the enforcement stage is to hold, perhaps, a protection already expired or one hard to land — by then too late. The particular arrangement must still be assessed with care against the transaction structure, the type of obligor and the adjudicative approach of the jurisdiction concerned, and cannot be applied as a single template.

The value of a VAM buy-back clause is fixed at signing, not after breach: whether the right can withstand the test of time, and whether the obligor is genuinely available for enforcement, matter far more than whether a buy-back was written in.
This article is general information on practice only; the laws, judicial interpretations and adjudicative approaches referred to are subject to their currently effective texts, and it does not constitute legal advice on any specific matter. The validity, period of exercise and obligor of any particular VAM arrangement must be verified case by case against the transaction structure, the contract terms and the adjudicative approach of the jurisdiction concerned. The Interpretation of the Company Law (Draft for Comment) had not formally taken effect as of the date of writing; the formally promulgated text governs.

Author & Team

  • 肖黄鹤 Xiao Huanghe
    Xiao HuangheGlobal Partner, DeHeng · DeHeng Shenzhen Hengxin Legal TeamIn investment and corporate disputes, he handles the validity and performance of VAM (valuation-adjustment) agreements, share buy-back and cash compensation, the period of exercise and limitation of the buy-back right, the obligor and third-party security, capital reduction and the capital-maintenance principle, and the response where a judgment is “supported yet defeated in enforcement”; and PRC–Hong Kong cross-jurisdiction transactions and cross-border dispute resolution and enforcement.
  • 李睿 Li Rui
    Li RuiPartner, DeHeng ShenzhenFinance-lease and commercial-finance disputes, investment and financing disputes, cross-border enforcement, criminal defence
  • 林博 Lin Bo
    Lin BoPartner, DeHeng ShenzhenCommercial transaction structuring and corporate disputes
  • 邓兆文 Deng Zhaowen
    Deng ZhaowenPractising Solicitor (HK) · GBA Lawyer, DeHeng ShenzhenCommon law, Hong Kong-related enforcement and disputes
  • 苏影彤 Su Yingtong
    Su YingtongPractising Lawyer, DeHeng ShenzhenCriminal defence, investment and financing disputes

Knowledge anchors

  • VAM / valuation-adjustment mechanism
  • Share buy-back · cash compensation
  • Period of exercise · formative right / claim in obligation
  • “No more than six months” · Judicial Answer Network (Ninth Batch)
  • Minutes art. 5 · valid in principle
  • Capital-reduction prerequisite · the reduction paradox
  • Obligor · company / founder / third-party security
  • Company Law Interpretation (Draft for Comment)

— Contact

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肖黄鹤 律师 · Xiao Huanghe[email protected] 李睿 律师 · Li Rui[email protected]